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EXPERIMENTAL AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES ON GRID 
RESOURCE ALLOCATION FOR THE SINGAPORE MARKET 
DANNY OH, STEVEN MILLER, HU NAN 
School of Information Systems 
Singapore Management University, Singapore 
In this paper, we describe our work on using the Tycoon system developed by HP Labs to 
provide a market-based resource allocation and bidding framework for a grid. We 
discuss how we intend to evaluate the feasibility of the Tycoon system by measuring its 
economic performance using agent-based simulation experiments for a particular type of 
grid usage scenario, namely, the digital media market scenario. We will also discuss a 
related effort in collecting and using real grid data from the National Grid Pilot Platform 
in Singapore and how we will be using real data collected to derive actual usage patterns 
to verify the demand models used in the experiments. Lastly, we discuss the impact and 
significance of our work in the design and execution of commercialized grid business 
models for the digital media grid market hub. 
1. Introduction 
Accenture [1] notes there are six major technologies which are evolving to form 
the foundations for realizing the vision of utility computing: 
• Grid Computing 
• Workload Management and Virtualization 
• Web Security 
• Data Center Automation 
• Autonomic Computing 
• Blade Computing 
In this paper, we describe our work on using the Tycoon system developed 
by HP Labs [19, 20, 21] to provide a market-based resource allocation and 
bidding framework for a grid. This work is a part of a larger effort in Singapore 
to provide grid technology applications and business models needed to support 
the emergence of a grid market hub where IT services can be provided to and 
purchased by a community of digital media users in a utility computing 
framework. Thus, this paper is focusing on one approach for incorporating a 
market-based resource allocation and bidding framework into the larger 
workload management infrastructure of a grid. 
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2. Motivation 
We evaluate the feasibility of the Tycoon system by measuring its economic 
performance using agent-based simulation experiments for a particular type of 
grid usage scenario, namely the digital media market scenario. We are exploring 
how Tycoon operates under various market conditions for this market scenario. 
We are using both experimental and empirical methods to gain insights into how 
we can design feasible and practical market-based resource allocation models for 
a digital media grid market. We are also exploring the limitations of the Tycoon 
system, in order to determine how to enhance the Tycoon framework or how to 
create policies or other measures to overcome the limitations. 
3. Related Work for the Experimental Analysis 
The key advantage of approaching resource allocation from an economics 
perspective is that it provides incentives for resource providers to participate in 
the grid as they are able to charge consumers "credits" for the use of IT 
resources. Resources are always limited and cannot be free for use or we will 
risk running into the "tragedy of the commons" problem [11]. Moreover, the 
market-based approach sets the stage for organizations to establish a pay-per-use 
model for IT services within their data centers and eventually allows for the 
trading of IT services in a grid market hub. Another advantage is that it allows 
researchers to draw upon a large body of economics and management science 
research that can be related to emerging grid markets, resource allocation and 
business models. 
The main types of market-based resource allocation models that have been 
studied in the context of grid computing are: 
• auction models [4, 8, 9, 19, 20, 21, 24, 27] 
• bid-based proportional share models [4, 10, 15] 
• commodity market models [12, 16, 28, 31, 32, 33, 36] 
• tendering/contract-net models [25, 34] 
• community/coalition/bartering models [26] 
Of these, the auction-based model appears to be the most widely studied 
type. Overviews of auction mechanisms are provided by Buyya et al. [29, 30] (as 
applied to grid computing as of 2002) and by Parkes et al. [19] (as applied to 
auctions in general as of 2003). Parkes et al. also illustrate the role of theoretical 
mechanism design in the design of auctions and exchanges for electronic 
markets. 
Potential benefits can be gained from automating markets. For example in a 
Tycoon-based market, agents could perform the laborious task of monitoring 
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whether the resource allocation has dropped below certain threshold, and if it 
does, help users to increase the bid. An overview of how agents and grid 
technologies can advance and support each other can be found in [14]. Wellman 
et al. [18] study the issues in the design of automated markets with software 
agents. 
The following papers by Kenyon et al. discuss the general issues on grid 
resource commercialization. In [6], Kenyon et al. provide a conceptual 
framework for grid resource commercialization. In [11], from past research in 
the financial and commodity markets, Kenyon et al. outline the lessons learnt in 
the long history of asset management and decision-support for these markets and 
shows the relevance of these lessons for grid commercialization. 
Existing bodies of work on Tycoon can be found in [20, 21, 23] We note 
two additional auction model research efforts that provide capabilities that are 
know to be limitations of the current Tycoon system. One interesting auction 
study [13] in the context of pricing for on-demand computing services is the 
contingent auction whereby users bid for computing resources in an auction, but 
are partially refunded if demand is not realized. Tycoon currently does not 
support the refund of credits for jobs that fail. The strategyproofness of an 
auction mechanism for dynamic resource allocation is also important in the grid 
environments such as the grid market hub. Parkes et al. describe in [7] the 
Virtual World mechanism which removes any incentive for a resource provider 
to overstate its available capacity (in order to get more bidders) and provides 
insights on how the resource provider can understate its capacity and increase its 
payments. Tycoon currently does not claim to be strategyproof. We will discuss 
Tycoon in more detail in the next section. 
4. Experimental View of Grid Resource Allocation using Tycoon 
4.1. Overview of the Tycoon System 
Tycoon is a market-based resource allocation system which allows users to bid 
and pay for resources using credits. Tycoon uses an open source virtualization 
tool called Xen [35] to create a virtualized layer between applications and the 
underlying hardware resources. In this way, Tycoon, through Xen, captures a 
uniform snapshot of the IT environment and connects IT resources that have 
been historically separated. Tycoon functions on top of this virtualized platform 
to help manage and provision hardware resources and continuously balance 
workloads through a Tycoon grid. 
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Each Tycoon host runs an auction share scheduler which listens to request 
for bids from clients and holds continuous bid auctions to determine resource 
allocation. Bid requests are specified in terms of constraints such as the amount 
of credits to spend and the deadline for job completion. These constraints can be 
changed while the job is running. The bid is computed as the pricing rate that the 
user will pay for the required job execution time. Both time and cost QoS 
attributes are considered. The request with the highest bid is then allocated the 
largest processor, memory and disk time slice, and the request with the second 
highest bid is allocated the second largest processor, memory and disk time slice, 
etc. Once the bid is accepted by a host, the auction share scheduler will 
instantiate a new Xen virtual machine to run the job. It will also perform the 
necessary setup and configuration to run the job. Once the staging of the job is 
completed, the job will be run immediately at the host. While the number of 
virtual hosts is less than the maximum number of virtual hosts allowable per 
physical host, the auctioneer will continue to listen for bids. And whenever a 
new bid is accepted, the auctioneer will recalculate the resource allocation share 
for each running job at regular intervals. 
The continuous bidding auction mechanism provides a means to solicit true 
user valuations for resources and it allows for more efficient resource allocation. 
It also enables adaptive resource allocation as new requests will modify and 
reduce the current resource allocations of existing executing requests. However, 
this could have a negative impact on risk-averse and latency-sensitive 
applications. One possible solution would be to implement resource reservation 
to secure resource entitlements in advance. However, Tycoon currently does not 
handle resource reservation. 
For resource management, Tycoon adopts a decentralized approach as each 
host self-manages its own set of local applications. Using virtual machines, 
multiple applications can be concurrently executed. Basic accounting 
information is kept in each host so that the usage-based service cost to be paid by 
the user can be calculated. 
Simulation results for performance evaluation [20, 21, 23] show that the 
Tycoon is able to achieve high fairness and low latency as compared to simple 
proportional-share strategy. Resource acquisition is also fast and limited only by 
communication delays. It also does not impose any manual bidding overhead on 
users. Moreover, the Tycoon resource allocation algorithm is relatively simple 
and it allows for the fast multiplexing of resources on a host. 
Additionally, Tycoon has demonstrated how communication and 
management overheads could be minimized in the design of auction mechanism. 
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For example, the continuous bidding auctions are held internally within each 
host and this reduces communication across hosts. 
4.2. Experimental Objectives 
The purpose of our experiments is to evaluate Tycoon's suitability to be 
deployed as a resource allocation and bidding mechanism in the digital media 
market scenario. To do so, we will measure its economic performance under 
several market conditions. 
4.3. Design of the Tycoon Simulation Experiments 
We will adopt an agent-based approach for the design and implementation of the 
simulation experiments. Software agents will be used to simulate actual users 
competing for resources on a particular Tycoon host. 
Table 1 provides an overview of the experiment setup. 
System Configuration 
• 2 Intel servers running Fedora Core 4 and Xen 3. 
• 1 server installed as Tycoon host and 1 server as Tycoon client. 
» 5 agents running on Tycoon client and submitting jobs to Tycoon host. 
Rationale 
• Tycoon works at node-level and not cluster-level. Therefore, it is sufficient 
to use only 1 Tycoon host for the experiment. 
Sample Workload Related to digital media 
• Blender rendering software. 
• 100-frame rendering job. 
Rationale 
• We have chosen the Blender rendering software as it is a widely used open-
source rendering tool by the digital media community. 
Demand Patterns 
Pattern 1: Equal Load 
• Rendering jobs of same duration submitted at regular intervals. 
Pattern 2: Bursty Load 
• Long rendering jobs submitted at the start of the simulation run. 
• Short rendering jobs submitted at pre-determined intervals. 
Pattern 3: Increasing Load 
• Rendering jobs with increasing durations submitted at regular intervals. 
Pattern 4: Decreasing Load 
» Rendering jobs with decreasing durations submitted at regular intervals. 
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• Run simulation experiments for each job distribution and for different 
bidding behaviours (i.e. willingness to change bid). 
• Before running the experiments, run a single instance of the 100-frame 
rendering job to determine the performance level (in CPU MHz) needed. 
• To start simulation, agent determines the expected job completion time (bid 
interval in seconds) for the given performance level. 
• Agent determines the expected credits to be spent (bid amount in $) for the 
given performance level and job completion time. 
• Agent determines the available hosts and select one host. 
• Agent submits the bid to the selected host. 
• Host performs the necessary setup to run the job if bid is successful. 
• While job is running, agent records and logs the following job information 
at regular intervals: 
••* Current share of resources allocated (CPU, memory and disk). 
• Current bid amount. 
•J* Current bid interval. 
• New bid amount. 
• New bid interval. 
••• Funds remaining. 
••• Time lapsed in seconds since job was started. 
•?» Number of frames rendered. 
Analysis of Simulation Results 
• Based on the simulation data collected, we want to determine the following: 
• Utility 
••• Defined as cost ($) per throughput. 
•t* Throughout is defined as total number of frames of the rendering job. 
• Efficiency 
••• Defined as the sum of utilities for all users across all time intervals. 
• Total Credits Used 
•!• Defined as the number of credits actually used to complete the job. 
• Additional Funding 
••• Defined as the number of additional credits needed to fund the account 
so that job can be completed. 
• Total Time Taken for Job Completion 
••• Defined as the number of seconds taken for a job to be completed. 
Lee, H., & Miller, S. (Eds.). (2006). <i>Gecon 2006</i>. Retrieved from http://ebookcentral.proquest.com




































4.4. Impacts and Contributions of Analysis 
From our initial study of Tycoon, the continuous bidding strategy has some 
inherent limitations. Even though Lai et al. [21] claim that users do not need to 
spend time to monitor their bids, we believe that users would need to frequently 
monitor the amount of resources allocated to their jobs. This is especially true if 
there is high resource competition on the host. The reason is that a user with a 
very large bid can potentially take over the entire system resources of the host. 
The other running jobs may potentially be halted due to insufficient resources. 
This problem cannot be resolved by transferring the job to another host as 
Tycoon currently does not support this. 
In addition, users with high priority jobs may not accept the continuous 
bidding strategy as there is no guarantee that their jobs will be completed after 
they have spent an initial amount of credits. They may need to spend more 
credits to get their jobs to be completed eventually if there is resource constraint 
on the host. 
One possible solution is to build bidding agents that help users automate the 
continuous bidding process. The agents can increase the bid amount if the 
resources allocated falls below a certain threshold. Similarly, if too much 
resources are allocated, the agents can help users to save credits by decreasing 
the bid amount. 
From the simulation results, we hope to gain more insights into the 
construction of an agent-mediated digital media grid market hub that uses 
Tycoon-like mechanisms for resource allocation and bidding. 
5. Related Work for the Empirical Analysis 
Published studies based on PlanetLab such as those by Chun et al. [2, 3] provide 
an empirical analysis of large data sets from federated distributed computational 
and communication infrastructures. These studies present detailed 
characterization of the actual use of the PlanetLab testbed in terms of the 
quantity and patterns of usage of network, CPU, memory and disk resources. 
Peterson et al. [22] have noted the difference between PlanetLab and a grid. 
Despite these differences, the concerns of PlanetLab and grids are converging, 
and we think that the empirical studies of resource usage in the PlanetLab 
settings should be carefully studied to provide guidance on what to expect in 
Grid settings. 
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6. Empirical View of Grid Resource Allocation in the National Grid 
Pilot Platform (NGPP) 
6.1. Empirical Objectives 
From the empirical analysis of the NGPP dataset, we aim to discover demand 
patterns that we can use to understand user behaviour in grid usage. We also can 
use the analysis results to verify and fine tune the demand patterns used for the 
simulation. If we can understand user behaviour in grid usage, for example, 
understand why certain nodes were used and why certain costs were paid, we 
could create better demand models and incorporate such preferences into the 
agents so as to run more realistic and accurate simulation experiments. 
6.2. Design of the Analysis Strategy of NGPP Dataset 
We will adopt a time-series analysis for the analysis and visualization of the 
NGPP dataset. Data will be analyzed and visualized in different ways, for 
example, in terms of big task vs small task and in terms of the nature of the task. 
We will also be examining the following distributions: 
• Distribution of the job (frequency vs. cumulative frequency). 
• Distribution of the length of each job (frequency vs. cumulative frequency). 
• Distribution of the normalized CPU/memory/disk usage per job. 
• Distribution of credits paid per job. 
From these distributions, we will use regression techniques and correlation 
matrices to derive the actual demand patterns in terms of the job structure and 
composition, and job quantity and distribution over time. 
6.3. Challenges of collecting a Grid Dataset 
A major challenge in gaining access to the NGPP dataset was to obtain the 
formal permissions from all of the resource providers to access the grid 
information. The NGPP user community is understandably very concerned about 
the security and privacy of the information. They do not want information on 
individual users to be revealed. To address the security and privacy concerns, we 
created and signed a non-disclosure agreement with each relevant organization 
contributing to or using the NGPP resources and we have also developed a 
filtering program to mask out user information before the data extraction. 
Working through the administrative issues to address the security and privacy 
concerns and to execute the non-disclosure agreements took about one year. 
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7. Reaching for Insights on Real World Market-Based Resource 
Allocation 
Many research efforts conducted by grid technology and management science 
researchers have concentrated on analyzing the efficiency or optimality of their 
resource allocation algorithms. Most of this prior work has not evolved to the 
stage of testing the algorithms using real world data sets or market situations. As 
we note, it is a challenging task for researchers to obtain access to real world 
data sets and market situations. We are pursuing a two-pronged approach of 
exploring the capabilities of the Tycoon resource allocation mechanism via the 
simulation of a digital media market scenario, and in parallel collecting and 
analyzing real grid data to understand patterns of resource usage. We believe this 
effort will help to bridge the gap between prior theoretical and experimental 
work and current and emerging needs to create practical market-based resource 
allocation models that can be used as the foundation for grid marketplaces where 
individual providers can construct business models that will make their services 
attractive to prospective users. 
This research is currently underway. We are implementing the proposed 
agent-based grid simulator for Tycoon on a Java platform and investigating the 
economic performance of Tycoon via simulation experiments of a digital media 
market scenario. 
8. Conclusion 
In this contribution, we have discussed how we intend to evaluate the feasibility 
of the Tycoon system by measuring its economic performance using agent-based 
simulation experiments for a particular type of grid usage scenario, namely, the 
digital media market scenario. We have also discussed a related but separate 
effort in collecting and using real grid data from the National Grid Pilot Platform 
in Singapore and how we will be using the data collected to verify the usage 
patterns used in the simulation. Lastly, we have outlined the impact and 
significance of our work in the design of feasible and practical market-based 
resource allocation models for a digital media grid market hub. 
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